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rhatto
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@@ -415,6 +415,19 @@ Superego:
than ever before. This time there shall be no killing of the father, not even a
"symbolic" killing -- because he may not find a successor.
[...]
Note: 20 In his paper on "The Delay of the Machine Age," Hanns Sachs made an
interesting attempt to demonstrate narcissism as a constitutive element of the
reality principle in Greek civilization. He discussed the problem of why the
Greeks did not develop a machine technology although they possessed the skill
and knowledge which would have enabled them to do so. He was not satisfied with
the usual explanations on economic and sociological grounds. Instead, he
proposed that the predominant narcissistic element in Greek culture prevented
technological progress: the libidinal cathexis of the body was so strong that
it militated against mechanization and automatization. Sachs' paper appeared in
the Psychoanalytic Quarterly, II (1933) , 42off.
### Repression due to exogenous factors: the central argument
Therefore, if the historical process tended to make obsolete the institutions
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@@ -735,6 +748,133 @@ Superego:
would be so small that a large area of repressive constraints and
modifications, no longer sustained by external forces , would collapse.
### The Aesthetic Dimension
Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), written largely
under the impact of the Critique of Judgment, aim at a remaking of civilization
by virtue of the liberating force of the aesthetic function: it is envisaged as
containing the possibility of a new reality principle.
[...]
Since it was civilization itself which "dealt modern man this wound," only a
new mode of civilization can heal it. The wound is caused by the antagonistic
relation between the two polar dimensions of the human existence. Schiller
describes this antagonism in a series of paired concepts: sensuousness and
reason, matter and form (spirit), nature and freedom, the particular and the
universal.
Each of the two dimensions is governed by a basic impulse: the "sensuous
impulse " and the "form-impulse." 20 The former is essentially passive,
receptive, the latter active, mastering, domineering . Culture is built by the
combination and interaction of these two impulses. But in the established
civilization, their relation has been an antagonistic one: instead of
reconciling both impulses by making sensuousness rational and reason sensuous,
civilization has subjugated sensuousness to reason in such a manner that the
former, if it reasserts itself , does so in destructive and "savage" forms
while the tyranny of reason impoverishes and barbarizes sensuousness. The
conflict must be resolved if human potentialities are to realize themselves
freely. Since only the impulses have the lasting force that fundamentally
affects the human existence, such reconciliation between the two impulses must
be the work of a third impulse. Schiller defines this third mediating impulse
as the play impulse, its objective as beauty, and its goal as freedom.
[...]
The quest is for the solution of a "political" problem : the liberation of man
from inhuman existential conditions. Schiller states that, in order to solve
the political problem, "one must pass through the aesthetic, since it is beauty
that leads to freedom." The play impulse is the vehicle of this liberation. The
impulse does not aim at playing "with" something ; rather it is the play of
life itself, beyond want and external compulsion -- the manifestation of an
existence without fear and anxiety, and thus the manifestation of freedom
itself.
Man is free only where he is free from constraint, external and internal,
physical and moral -- when he is constrained neither by law nor by need. 21 But
such constraint is the reality. Freedom is thus, in a strict sense, freedom
from the established reality: man is free when the "reality loses its
seriousness" and when its necessity "becomes light" ( leicht). 22 "The greatest
stupidity and the greatest intelligence have a certain affinity with each other
in that they both seek only the real"; however, such need for and attachment to
the real are "merely the results of want."
In contrast, "indifference to reality" and interest in "show" (dis-play,
Schein) are the tokens of freedom from want and a "true enlargement of
humanity." 23 In a genuinely humane civilization, the human existence will be
play rather than toil, and man will live in display rather than need.
These ideas represent one of the most advanced positions of thought. It must be
understood that the liberation from the reality which is here envisaged is not
transcendental, "inner," or merely intellectual freedom (as Schiller explicitly
emphasizes 24 ) but freedom in the reality. The reality that "loses its
seriousness" is the inhumane reality of want and need, and it loses its
seriousness when wants and needs can be satisfied without alienated labor.
Then, man is free to "play" with his faculties and potentialities and with
those of nature, and only by "playing" with them is he free. His world is then
display ( Schein), and its order is that of beauty.
Because it is the realization of freedom, play is more than the constraining
physical and moral reality: ". . man is only serious with the agreeable, the
good, the perfect; but with beauty he plays." 25 Such formulations would be
irresponsible "aestheticism" if the realm of play were one of ornament, luxury,
holiday, in an otherwise repressive world. But here the aesthetic function is
conceived as a principle governing the entire human existence, and it can do so
only if it becomes "universal."
[...]
If we reassemble its main elements, we find:
(1) The transformation of toil (labor) into play, and of repressive
productivity into "display" -- a transformation that must be preceded by the
conquest of want (scarcity) as the determining factor of civilization. 43
(2) The self-sublimation of sensuousness (of the sensuous impulse) and the
de-sublimation of reason (of the form-impulse) in order to reconcile the two
basic antagonistic impulses.
(3) The conquest of time in so far as time is destructive of lasting
gratification.
These elements are practically identical with those of a reconciliation between
pleasure principle and reality principle. We recall the constitutive role
attributed to imagination (phantasy) in play and display: Imagination preserves
the objectives of those mental processes which have remained free from the
repressive reality principle; in their aesthetic function, they can be
incorporated into the conscious rationality of mature civilization. The play
impulse stands for the common denominator of the two opposed mental processes
and principles.
[...]
Non-repressive order is essentially an order of abundance: the necessary
constraint is brought about by "superfluity" rather than need. Only an order of
abundance is compatible with freedom. At this point, the idealistic and the
materialistic critiques of culture meet. Both agree that nonrepressive order
becomes possible only at the highest maturity of civilization, when all basic
needs can be satisfied with a minimum expenditure of physical and mental energy
in a minimum of time.
[...]
Possession and procurement of the necessities of life are the prerequisite,
rather than the content, of a free society. The realm of necessity, of labor,
is one of unfreedom because the human existence in this realm is determined by
objectives and functions that are not its own and that do not allow the free
play of human faculties and desires.
The optimum in this realm is therefore to be defined by standards of
rationality rather than freedom -- namely, to organize production and
distribution in such a manner that the least time is spent for making all
necessities available to all members of society. Necessary labor is a system of
essentially inhuman, mechanical, and routine activities; in such a system,
individuality cannot be a value and end in itself. Reasonably, the system of
societal labor would be organized rather with a view to saving time and space
for the development of individuality outside the inevitably repressive
work-world. Play and display, as principles of civilization, imply not the
transformation of labor but its complete subordination to the freely evolving
potentialities of man and nature.
### Misc
But, again, Freud shows that this repressive system does not really solve the
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