Updates books/sociology/counterrevolution

books/sociology/counterrevolution.md

@@ -1165,3 +1165,29 @@ Counterinsurgency goes domestic:
     eradicate them, initially through police arrests, then through criminal
     prosecutions (for instance, of the New York 21) and justified homicides [...]
     and ultimately by fomenting conflict and divisiveness within the party
+
+    [...]
+
+    The linchpin of a domesticated counterinsurgency is to bring total
+    information awareness home. Just as it was developed abroad, it is total
+    surveillance alone that makes it possible to distinguish the active minority on
+    domestic soil from the passive masses of Americans. A fully transparent
+    population is the first requisite of the counterinsurgency method. In General
+    Petraeus’s field manual, it received a full chapter early on, “Intelligence in
+    Counterinsurgency,” with a pithy and poignant epigraph: “Everything good that
+    happens seems to come from good intelligence.” And as the manual began, so it
+    ended, with the following simple mantra: “The ultimate success or failure of the
+    [counterinsurgency] mission depends on the effectiveness of the intelligence effort."
+
+    [...]
+
+    American is a potential insurgent.
+    Constant vigilance of the American population is necessary—hand in hand
+    with the appearance of trust. Appearances are vital. A domesticated
+    counterinsurgency must suspect everyone in the population, but not let it be
+    known. This posture, developed in counterinsurgency theory decades ago, was at
+    the core of the paradigm. David Galula had refined it to a witty statement he
+    would tell his soldiers in Algeria: “One cannot catch a fly with vinegar. My rules
+    are: outwardly you must treat every civilian as a friend; inwardly you must
+    consider him as a rebel ally until you have positive proof to the contrary.” 2 This
+    mantra has become the rule today—at home.