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40 results

monkeysign

  • Clone with SSH
  • Clone with HTTPS
  • Antoine Beaupré's avatar
    anarcat authored
    The SigSpoof vulnerability found in GnuPG also affects Monkeysign, but
    in a lesser way. We check signatures only in one place: when we import
    images. This is a corner use case that is probably quite uncommon and
    since it requires access to the file in itself, it's likely there are
    already other ways to import arbitrary signatures into monkeysign.
    
    Still, we play it safe and disable the "verbose" mode that can
    possibly be enabled in `gnupg.conf` as recommended by the reporter,
    Marcus Brinkmann.
    2c9c9ff3
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