index.md

title="GrapheneOS for Anarchists"
date=2023-04-05

[taxonomies]
categories = ["Defensive"]
tags = ["intro", "mobile", "easy"]

[extra]
toc = true
blogimage="/images/graphene.png"
dateedit=2023-05-10
a4="grapheneos-a4.pdf"
letter="grapheneos-letter.pdf"

While anarchists should minimize the presence of phones in their lives, if you do decide to use a phone, make it as difficult as possible for an adversary to geotrack it, intercept its messages, or hack it. This means using GrapheneOS.

What is GrapheneOS?

GrapheneOS is a security-focused version of the Android operating system. Standard Android smartphones have Google baked into them (for example, Google Play Services have irrevocable access to your files, call logs, location, etc.). GrapheneOS uses hardware-based security to make it far more difficult to bypass the disk encryption, it is significantly hardened against hacking, and it removes all Google apps and services by default. There are other alternative Android operating systems, but they don't have comparable security. See the GrapheneOS documentation for an extensive list of privacy and security improvements over standard Android.

Due to the nature of how the technology works, cell phones connecting to cell towers give the provider a history of your geolocation. For this reason, we recommend that you leave your smartphone at home and use it like a landline, connecting to the Internet via Wi-Fi in airplane mode, rather than using a SIM card to connect through cell towers. Even if you use an anonymously purchased SIM card, if it is linked to your identity in the future, the service provider can be retroactively queried for all geolocation data. Furthermore, it's not enough to only leave your phone at home when you're going to a demo or action, as this will stand out as an outlier and serve as an indication of conspiratorial activity in that time window.

Installation

Google Pixel phones are currently the only devices that meet the hardware security requirements of GrapheneOS - see supported and recommended devices. Starting with the Pixel 6, Pixel devices will receive at least 5 years of security updates from the date of release. End-of-life devices (GrapheneOS "extended support" devices) do not receive full security updates and therefore are not recommended. Avoid carrier variants of the phone, i.e. don't buy one from a mobile operator, which may prevent you from installing GrapheneOS. The cheapest option is to buy the "a" model right after the next flagship model is released - for example, the Google Pixel 6a after the Pixel 7 is released.

GrapheneOS can be installed using a web browser or the command line. If you are uncomfortable with command line, the web browser installer is fine; as the instructions note, "Even if the computer you used to flash GrapheneOS was compromised and an attacker replaced GrapheneOS with their own malicious OS, it can be detected with Auditor", which is explained below. Both methods list the officially supported operating systems.

The first time you boot Graphene, it will ask you if you want to connect to Wi-Fi. Don't, we need to do hardware-based attestation first. Never set up fingerprint authentication. Set a strong password.

There is no official support for installing from Qubes OS, but it is possible with the following steps.

Installation on Qubes OS

These instructions assume that your sys-usb qube is disposable, which is the default in the post-installation settings.

• In a disposable Whonix-Workstation qube, open the command line installation guide using Tor Browser.
• You will read "Installing from an OS in a virtual machine is not recommended. USB passthrough is often not reliable." This means we will be doing everything from sys-usb, which does not use USB passthrough. If you set sys-usb to be disposable when you installed Qubes OS, it will be reset after a reboot.
• For simplicity, we will temporarily enable networking in sys-usb. It is also possible to keep sys-usb offline by copying platform-tools and the factory image from a whonix disposable into sys-usb, and getting udev rules from Github instead of apt. In the Settings → Basic tab of sys-usb, make the following changes:
  • Private storage max size: 10.0 GB
  • Net qube: sys-firewall
  • Press Apply
• Follow the installation instructions in the sys-usb terminal. When you get to Flashing factory images, don't run ./flash-all.sh. Instead, scroll down to Troubleshooting and run the command that uses a different temporary directory. The flash script is expected to print out messages like archive does not contain 'example.img'.
• When you're done, restart sys-usb. If it is disposable, the changes you made will be gone. Don't forget to change the sys-usb qube settings back:
  • Net qube: (none)

System navigation

GrapheneOS uses gesture navigation by default. The essentials are:

• The bottom of the screen is a dedicated touch zone for system navigation.
• Swiping up from the navigation bar while removing your finger from the screen is the Home gesture.
• Swiping up from the navigation bar while keeping your finger on the screen before letting go is the Recent Apps gesture.
• Swiping from the left or right side of the screen within the app (not the navigation bar) is the Back gesture.
• The launcher uses a swipe-up gesture from anywhere on the screen to open the app drawer from the home screen. You must start this gesture above the system navigation bar.

Auditor

In the post-installation instructions, Hardware-based attestation is the last step. The Auditor app included in GrapheneOS uses hardware security features to monitor the integrity of the device's firmware and software. This is critical because it will alert you if the device is maliciously tampered with. The Auditor app must be configured immediately after GrapheneOS is installed, before any Internet connection is made.

How does it work? Your new device is the auditee, and the auditor can be either another instance of the Auditor app on a friend's phone or the Remote Attestation Service; we recommend doing both. The auditor and auditee pair to create a private key, and if the auditee's operating system is tampered with after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be alerted.

First, immediately after installing the device and before connecting to the Internet, perform a "local verification". This requires the presence of a friend whom you see semi-regularly and who has the Auditor app (on any Android device). The first pairing will show a brown background, and subsequent audits will show attestation results with a green background if nothing is remiss. There is no remote connection established between the phones of the auditor and auditee; you must perform these verifications in person.

We recommend using the phone as a Wi-Fi only device. Turn on airplane mode, and then turn on Wi-Fi. This "will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the device via the cellular radio." Leave airplane mode on at all times - otherwise the phone will interact with cellular networks even if there is no SIM card the phone.

You are now ready to connect to Wi-Fi. Once you have an Internet connection, we recommend that you immediately set up a scheduled remote verification with an email that you check regularly. The default delay until alerts is 48 hours; if you know your phone will be off for a longer period, you can update the configuration to a maximum of two weeks. If your phone will be off for more than two weeks (for example, if you leave it at home while traveling), simply ignore the notification emails. You can always log back in to view your attestation history.

User Profiles

User profiles are a feature that allows you to compartmentalize your phone, similar to how Qubes OS compartmentalizes your computer. User profiles have their own instances of apps, app data, and profile data. Apps can't see the apps in other user profiles and can only communicate with apps within the same user profile. In other words, user profiles are isolated from each other - if one is compromised, the others aren't necessarily.

The Owner user profile is the default profile that is present when you turn on the phone. You can create additional user profiles. Each profile is encrypted with its own encryption key and cannot access the data of other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. A shortcut for switching between different user profiles is located at the bottom of Quick Settings (accessible by swiping down twice from the top of the screen). When you press End session on a profile, that profile's data is encrypted at rest.

We'll now create a second user profile for all applications that don't require Google Play services:

• Settings → System → Multiple users, press Add user. You can name it Default and press Switch to Default.
• Set a strong password that is different from your Owner user profile password.
• In the Default user profile, Settings → Security → Screen lock settings → Lock after screen timeout can be set to 30 minutes to minimize how often you'll have to re-enter the password.

Later, we will optionally create a third user profile for applications that require Google Play services.

To reiterate, the user profiles and their purposes are:

1) Owner

• Where applications are installed

2) Default

• Where applications are used

3) Google (optional)

• Where applications that require Google Play services are used

How to Install Software

The GrapheneOS app store contains the standalone applications developed by the GrapheneOS project, such as Vanadium, Auditor, Camera, and PDF Viewer. These are automatically updated.

To install additional software, avoid F-Droid due to its numerous security issues. GrapheneOS has a Sandboxed Google Play that can be installed through the GrapheneOS app store: "Google Play receives absolutely no special access or privileges on GrapheneOS". Alternatively, you can use the Aurora Store, though it has some of the same security issues as F-Droid.

The approach we will take is that all applications needed in any user profile will be installed in the Owner user profile, using Sandboxed Google Play. In the Owner user profile, all installed applications (except the VPN) will be "disabled". Then we'll use the Install available apps feature to delegate apps to the secondary profiles that you need them in. Automatic updates in the Owner user profile will also automatically be applied to the secondary user profiles.

To install and configure Sandboxed Google Play:

• In the Owner user profile, install Sandboxed Google Play by opening Apps and installing Google Play services (this will also install the Google Services Framework and the Google Play Store).
• The Google Play Store requires a Google account to sign in, but one with false info can be created for exclusive use with the Google Play Store.
• Once installed and signed in, disable the advertising ID: Settings → Apps → Sandboxed Google Play → Google Settings → Ads, and select Delete advertising ID.
• Automatic updates are enabled by default on the Google Play Store: Google Play Store Settings → Network Preferences → Auto-update apps.
• Notifications for Google Play Store and Google Play Services must be enabled for auto-updates to work: Settings → Apps → Google Play Store / Google Play Services → Notifications. If you get notifications from the Play Store that it wants to update itself, accept them.

You are now ready to install applications from the Google Play Store. The first application we will install is a VPN. If you want to use a free VPN, we recommend RiseupVPN. If you want to pay for a VPN anonymously, we recommend both Mullvad and IVPN. VPNs must be installed in each user profile separately. All standard GrapheneOS connections will be forced through the VPN (except for connectivity checks, which can be optionally disabled). We recommended using a VPN in every profile, for reasons that are well-summarized by the Security Lab:

Using a reputable VPN provider can provide more privacy against surveillance from your ISP or government and prevent network injection attacks from those entities. A VPN will also make traffic correlation attacks – especially those targeting messaging apps – more difficult to perform and less effective.

Using the example of RiseupVPN, once installed, accept the 'Connection request' prompt. A green display means that the VPN has been successfully connected. Navigate to Advanced settings in the RiseupVPN menu, click Always-on VPN and follow the instructions. From now on, the VPN will connect automatically when you turn on your phone. Continue installing other apps - see Encrypted Messaging for Anarchists for ideas.

Now we will delegate apps to the profiles they are needed in:

• In the Owner profile, disable all applications downloaded from the Play Store except for the VPN: Settings → Apps → [Example] → Disable.
• To install Riseup VPN (or any other app) in the Default user profile: Settings → System → Multiple users → Default → Install available apps, then select Riseup VPN.

Software That Isn't On the Play Store

Some apps are not on the Play Store, either because they're still in development or because they don't want users to have to interact with Google. The Play Store can be used to update apps, but if you download individual .apk files, you have to remember to update them yourself (there are exceptions, like Signal, which is designed to update itself). Obtainium is an app to keep track of which apks need to be updated, and is available on the GitHub Releases page; app-arm64-v8a-release.apk of the latest release is what you want (arm64-v8a is the processor architecture). If you need apps that aren't available in the Play Store, install Obtainium in the Owner user profile (and don't disable it). Use the same process as above to install apps into the Owner user profile, but through Obtainium, then disable the app and delegate it to the profiles it is needed in. Unfortunately, apps obtained through Obtainium require manual updates - it will notify you when one is needed.

As an example of how to use Obtainium, Molly-FOSS is a hardened version of Signal without Google software and is available from Github Releases. In Obtanium, press Add App, then copy the Github Releases URL. Obtanium will be able to install the app, and if there is a new version, you will get a system notification and an update icon next to it, and you will need to update it manually.

Software That Requires Google Play Services

If there is an app you want to use that requires Google Play services, create a specific user profile for it from the Owner user profile. This is also a good way to isolate any app you need to use that isn't open-source or reputable. If you create a Google user profile, you will need to install and configure Sandboxed Google Play in it.

Many banking apps will require Sandboxed Google Play. However, banking can simply be accessed through a computer to avoid the need for this Google user profile.

VoIP

A Wi-Fi only smartphone doesn't require a service plan. As explained in Kill the Cop in Your Pocket, bureaucracies often require a phone number that can be called from a normal phone (without encryption). VoIP applications allow you to create a number and make calls over Wi-Fi rather than through cell towers. A phone number is also occasionally required for applications such as Signal registration, and a VoIP number will usually work.

Some of the VoIP applications that work on computers also work on smartphones; the main advantage is that you can hear the phone ringing even when your computer is turned off. The jmp.chat VoIP service works well with their Cheogram client and can be paid for in Bitcoin. There are also mobile-only paid options such as MySudo (although it only works in a handful of countries). A MySudo subscription can be purchased anonymously with Google Play gift cards, but this is probably unnecessary if the point is to give the number to bureaucracies. MySudo requires Google Play Services.

Tor

You may want to use Tor from a smartphone. However, if you need the anonymity of Tor rather than the privacy of Riseup VPN, you should use either Qubes OS or Tails on a computer. The Graphene docs recommend avoiding Gecko-based browsers like Tor Browser, as these browsers "do not have internal sandboxing on Android." Orbot is an app that can route traffic from any other app on your device through the Tor network, but simply using the Vanadium browser through Orbot is not recommended by the Tor Project.

Recommended Settings and Habits

• [Owner user profile] Settings → Security → Auto reboot: 8 hours
  • The automatic reboot, if no profile has been unlocked for several hours, will put the device fully at rest again, where Full Disk Encryption is most effective. It will reboot at least overnight if you forget to turn it off. If the device is compromised by malware, then Verified Boot will prevent and revert any changes to the operating system files when the device is rebooted. If the police ever manage to get their hands on your phone while it is in a lock-screen state, this setting will return it to a more effective encryption once the time has elapsed.
• Leave the Global Toggles for Bluetooth, location services, the camera, and the microphone disabled when you don't need them for a specific purpose. Apps cannot use disabled features (even with individual permissions) until they are re-enabled. Also set a Bluetooth timeout: Settings → Connected devices → Bluetooth timeout: 2 minutes
• Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. For example, if you want to send a picture on Signal, do not grant Signal access to "photos and videos" because it will have access to all of your pictures. Instead, in the Files app, long-press to select the picture, and then share it with Signal.
• Once you have all the applications you need installed in a secondary user profile, disable app installation in that profile - apps installed in a secondary user profile delegated from the Owner profile will still be updated.
  • [Owner user profile] Settings → System → Multiple users → [Username] → App installs and updates: Disabled
• When an app asks for storage permissions, select Storage Scopes. This will make the app think that it has all the storage permissions it is requesting, when in fact it has none.
• It is convenient to be able to receive notifications from any user profile:
  • [Owner user profile] Settings → System → Multiple users: Send notifications to current user (enabled)

How to Backup

Don’t use cloud backups. You can't trust the corporate options, and they're the easiest way for the police to access your data. If you must back up your phone, back it up to your encrypted computer.

GrapheneOS currently offers Seedvault as a backup solution, but it's not very reliable. As the documentation notes, connecting directly to a computer requires "needing to trust the computer with coarse-grained access", so it is best to avoid it. Instead, you can manually back up files by copying them to a USB-C flash drive using the Files app, or sending them to yourself using an encrypted messaging app like Element (Matrix).

Password Management

If you feel you need a password manager, KeePassDX is a good option. However, most app credentials can be stored in KeePassXC on a computer because they don't need to be entered regularly. The setup described in this guide requires memorizing two passwords:

1. The Owner user profile (boot password)
2. The Default user profile
3. (Optional) Apps like Cwtch and Molly have their own passwords.

Be sure to turn off the phone overnight and when you leave it at home. If the police get access when the phone is turned on (at a lock-screen), the "Auto reboot" setting will turn it off before they have much time to try a brute-force attack. For advice on password quality, see Tails Best Practices.

Linux Desktop Phones

Why recommend a Pixel over a Linux desktop phone? Linux desktop phones like the PinePhone Pro are much easier to hack than GrapheneOS because they lack modern security features like full system MAC policies, verified boot, strong app sandboxing, and modern exploit mitigations. Their hardware architecturally lacks modern security features like hardware based encryption (via a Trusted Execution Environment/Secure Element) and has questionable integration of components such as the modem.

Wrapping Up

With the set-up described in this guide, if a cop starts with your name, they won’t be able to simply look it up in a cellular provider database to get your phone number. If you use the phone as a Wi-Fi only device and always leave it at home, it cannot be used to determine your movement profile and history. If you use a VoIP number, it's accessed through a VPN, so even if that number is known, it can't be used to locate you. All communications with comrades use end-to-end encryption so they do not aid in network mapping. Even if you are unlucky enough to be the target of a well-funded investigation, the hardened operating system makes it difficult to compromise with spyware, and such a compromise should be detectable.

By storing the phone in a tamper-evident manner when it's not in use, you'll be able to tell if it's been physically accessed. See the guide Make Your Electronics Tamper-Evident.

The forum is generally very helpful for any remaining questions you may have.