wtf

[-@benkler-2006] define como "tragedia de los Comunes".

In 1968, Garret Hardin first introduced the concept of the tragedy of

the Commons referring to the degradation of a finite resource used by a

group of individuals who act independently and rationally on the basis of

their self-interest. If individuals agreed to assign private management

responsibility, which would implement a protection fence around the

resource against the “rational” behaviour of all, the resource would

be safe (Hardin 1968). Elinor Ostrom (1990) understates Hardin's approach

claiming that if those, who share a certain resource, belonged to a local

community, then they would adopt the optimal solutions to serve their

interests. In certain cases the aforementioned statement cannot apply,

because of a lack of confidence amongst community members due to the high

communication costs and/or because of the small benefit from the problem

solving. However, the criteria that Ostrom (1990) articulates are also immanent in Hardin's definition as a

matter of the rational behaviour of individuals. Ostrom (1990) correctly

denotes that the resource sustainability can be achieved by adopting best

practices without the need of privatisation. What eludes both Hardin and

Ostrom is that the best practices or the technical means are defined by

those in power. There is arguably almost no possibility of implementing

measures that would not enforce the established structure. The shared

resource may not become private, but the extraeconomic support of

other privatised means in the infrastructure of the common resource

(e.g. friendly policies toward activities regardless of business plan)

could gradually eradicate the resource. Once again, the ruling agenda

defines whether the technical means can be considered best practice.

the Commons referring to the degradation of a finite resource used by

a group of individuals who act independently and rationally on the

basis of their self-interest. If individuals agreed to assign private

management responsibility, which would implement a protection fence

around the resource against the “rational” behaviour of all, the

resource would be safe (Hardin 1968). Elinor Ostrom (1990) understates

Hardin's approach claiming that if those, who share a certain resource,

belonged to a local community, then they would adopt the optimal

solutions to serve their interests. In certain cases the aforementioned

statement cannot apply, because of a lack of confidence amongst

community members due to the high communication costs and/or because

of the small benefit from the problem solving. However, the criteria

that Ostrom (1990) articulates are also immanent in Hardin's definition

as a matter of the rational behaviour of individuals. Ostrom (1990)

correctly denotes that the resource sustainability can be achieved by

adopting best practices without the need of privatisation. What eludes

both Hardin and Ostrom is that the best practices or the technical means

are defined by those in power. There is arguably almost no possibility

of implementing measures that would not enforce the established

structure. The shared resource may not become private, but the

extraeconomic support of other privatised means in the infrastructure of

the common resource (e.g. friendly policies toward activities regardless

of business plan) could gradually eradicate the resource. Once again,

the ruling agenda defines whether the technical means can be considered

best practice.

En 1968, Garret Hardin introdujo por primera vez el concepto de la

tragedia de los Comunes en referencia a la degradación de un recurso

finito al ser utilizado por individuos que actúan independiente y

racionalmente sobre la base del interés propio.  Si los individuos

acuerdan asignar una responsabilidad administrativa privada, lo que

implementaría un vallado protectivo alrededor del recurso contra el

comportamiento "racional" de todos, el recurso estaría a salvo

[@hardin-1968].  Elinor Ostrom [-@ostrom-1990] minimiza el abordaje de

Hardin al decir que si aquellos que comparte un recurso determinado

pertenecen a una misma comunidad, entonces adoptarán las soluciones

óptimas para servir a sus intereses.  En ciertos casos la declaración

anterior no puede aplicarse, por la falta de confianza entre los

miembros de la comunidad debido a los altos costos comunicacionales y/o

por el pequeño beneficio que otorga solucionar el problema.  Sin

embargo, el criterio que Ostrom [-@ostrom-1990] articula son también

inmanentes a la definición de Hardin porque en ambos casos se trata de

la conducta racional de individuos.  Ostrom [-@ostrom-1990] denota

correctamente que la sostenibilidad del recurso puede alcanzarse

mediante la adopción de buenas prácticas sin necesidad de privatización.

Lo que eluden tanto Hardin como Ostrom es que las buenas prácticas o los

medios técnicos son definidos por aquellos que tienen el poder.  No hay

casi ninguna posibilidad de implementar medidas que no requieran la

aplicación de la estructura establecida.  El recurso compartido no se

privatiza pero el soporte extraeconómico de otros medios privatizados en

la infraestructura del recurso común (por ejemplo las políticas

amistosas hacia actividades a pesar del plan de negocios) pueden llegar

a erradicarlo gradualmente.  Una vez más, la agenda dominante define

cuáles medios técnicos pueden ser considerados buenas prácticas.

Hardin's (1968) position about salvation through privatisation has been

claimed for forests. If forests get privatised, the manager's best

interest would be to protect the wood from fire and the uncontrolled