Commit 3cc6ab09 authored by Nicolás Reynolds's avatar Nicolás Reynolds Committed by Mauricio Pasquier Juan

wtf

parent 73e4332f
......@@ -429,29 +429,61 @@ transformación "parodia de los Comunes" en relación a lo que Benkler
[-@benkler-2006] define como "tragedia de los Comunes".
In 1968, Garret Hardin first introduced the concept of the tragedy of
the Commons referring to the degradation of a finite resource used by a
group of individuals who act independently and rationally on the basis of
their self-interest. If individuals agreed to assign private management
responsibility, which would implement a protection fence around the
resource against the “rational” behaviour of all, the resource would
be safe (Hardin 1968). Elinor Ostrom (1990) understates Hardin's approach
claiming that if those, who share a certain resource, belonged to a local
community, then they would adopt the optimal solutions to serve their
interests. In certain cases the aforementioned statement cannot apply,
because of a lack of confidence amongst community members due to the high
communication costs and/or because of the small benefit from the problem
solving. However, the criteria that Ostrom (1990) articulates are also immanent in Hardin's definition as a
matter of the rational behaviour of individuals. Ostrom (1990) correctly
denotes that the resource sustainability can be achieved by adopting best
practices without the need of privatisation. What eludes both Hardin and
Ostrom is that the best practices or the technical means are defined by
those in power. There is arguably almost no possibility of implementing
measures that would not enforce the established structure. The shared
resource may not become private, but the extraeconomic support of
other privatised means in the infrastructure of the common resource
(e.g. friendly policies toward activities regardless of business plan)
could gradually eradicate the resource. Once again, the ruling agenda
defines whether the technical means can be considered best practice.
the Commons referring to the degradation of a finite resource used by
a group of individuals who act independently and rationally on the
basis of their self-interest. If individuals agreed to assign private
management responsibility, which would implement a protection fence
around the resource against the “rational” behaviour of all, the
resource would be safe (Hardin 1968). Elinor Ostrom (1990) understates
Hardin's approach claiming that if those, who share a certain resource,
belonged to a local community, then they would adopt the optimal
solutions to serve their interests. In certain cases the aforementioned
statement cannot apply, because of a lack of confidence amongst
community members due to the high communication costs and/or because
of the small benefit from the problem solving. However, the criteria
that Ostrom (1990) articulates are also immanent in Hardin's definition
as a matter of the rational behaviour of individuals. Ostrom (1990)
correctly denotes that the resource sustainability can be achieved by
adopting best practices without the need of privatisation. What eludes
both Hardin and Ostrom is that the best practices or the technical means
are defined by those in power. There is arguably almost no possibility
of implementing measures that would not enforce the established
structure. The shared resource may not become private, but the
extraeconomic support of other privatised means in the infrastructure of
the common resource (e.g. friendly policies toward activities regardless
of business plan) could gradually eradicate the resource. Once again,
the ruling agenda defines whether the technical means can be considered
best practice.
En 1968, Garret Hardin introdujo por primera vez el concepto de la
tragedia de los Comunes en referencia a la degradación de un recurso
finito al ser utilizado por individuos que actúan independiente y
racionalmente sobre la base del interés propio. Si los individuos
acuerdan asignar una responsabilidad administrativa privada, lo que
implementaría un vallado protectivo alrededor del recurso contra el
comportamiento "racional" de todos, el recurso estaría a salvo
[@hardin-1968]. Elinor Ostrom [-@ostrom-1990] minimiza el abordaje de
Hardin al decir que si aquellos que comparte un recurso determinado
pertenecen a una misma comunidad, entonces adoptarán las soluciones
óptimas para servir a sus intereses. En ciertos casos la declaración
anterior no puede aplicarse, por la falta de confianza entre los
miembros de la comunidad debido a los altos costos comunicacionales y/o
por el pequeño beneficio que otorga solucionar el problema. Sin
embargo, el criterio que Ostrom [-@ostrom-1990] articula son también
inmanentes a la definición de Hardin porque en ambos casos se trata de
la conducta racional de individuos. Ostrom [-@ostrom-1990] denota
correctamente que la sostenibilidad del recurso puede alcanzarse
mediante la adopción de buenas prácticas sin necesidad de privatización.
Lo que eluden tanto Hardin como Ostrom es que las buenas prácticas o los
medios técnicos son definidos por aquellos que tienen el poder. No hay
casi ninguna posibilidad de implementar medidas que no requieran la
aplicación de la estructura establecida. El recurso compartido no se
privatiza pero el soporte extraeconómico de otros medios privatizados en
la infraestructura del recurso común (por ejemplo las políticas
amistosas hacia actividades a pesar del plan de negocios) pueden llegar
a erradicarlo gradualmente. Una vez más, la agenda dominante define
cuáles medios técnicos pueden ser considerados buenas prácticas.
Hardin's (1968) position about salvation through privatisation has been
claimed for forests. If forests get privatised, the manager's best
interest would be to protect the wood from fire and the uncontrolled
......
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