30' de traduccion :P

necesarias para que podamos tomar café").  En la era de las máquinas

autónomas, así podrían verse los consejos obreros.

Automata, Copies and Replicators Yet, is planning necessary at all?

Automata, Copies and Replicators

# Autómatas, copias y replicadoras

Yet, is planning necessary at all?

Centralized, neo-socialist planning schemes and decentralized, networked

councilist versions both see computers as calculative instruments, a

means to measure, particularly to measure work: their aim is to abolish

‘enough’, or what combination of growth and redistribution is adequate

to attain it: this surely would be the issue facing the collective

planners of the future. It will, however, identify three cybernetic

Aun así, ¿es necesaria la planificación?  Los esquemas de planificación

neo-socialistas centralizados tanto como sus contrapartes consejistas

decentralizadas toman las computadoras como instrumentos de cálculo y de

medición, particularmente en la medición del trabajo.  Su objetivo es

abolir la explotación capitalista retornándole a las trabajadoras el

valor completo de su tiempo de trabajo.  Sin embargo existe otra línea

del futurismo comunista que entiende a las computadoras no tanto como

instrumentos de planificación sino como máquinas de abundancia.

Podríamos decir que existen dos formas de ganarle a la catalaxia

capitalista de Hayek.  La primera es superarla en capacidad de cálculo.

La segunda es demolerla: la escasez es reemplazada por plenitud,

terminando con la necesidad de los precios o la planificación.  Para las

marxistas, la "abundancia" cierra la transición desde la fase "baja" del

comunismo, que todavía debe resolver los problemas de la escasez, a una

fase más alta bajo el principio "de cada quien según su capacidad,

a cada quien según su necesidad".  Una metáfora popular para las

condiciones tecnológicas necesarias para este último momento es el

"replicador" de _Star Trek_, que automáticamente y con energía infinita

provee a las necesidades humanas [@fraise-2011].  Este ensayo no intenta

adjudicar qué nivel de satisfacción de necesidades debería ser

considerado "suficiente" o qué combinación de crecimiento

y redistribución es adecuada para alcanzarlo.  Este seguramente será el

problema de las planificadoras colectivas del futuro.  Sin embargo,

identificamos tres tendencias cibernéticas

tendencies that point towards the ‘higher’ phase of communism:

automation, copying and peer-to-peer production.  Automation has been

the most central to the communist imagination. Its classic statement is

  train, that are now replacing workers not just in manufacturing but in

  distribution, circulation and service processes such as warehousing,

  call centres and even elder care (Markoff, 2012: np). Erik

que apuntan hacia esta fase "alta" del comunismo: la automatización, la

copia y la producción de pares.  La automatización ha sido la más

central para la imaginación comunista.  Su postulado clásico es el ahora

famoso "Fragmento sobre las máquinas" de los Grundrisse, donde al

observar la fábrica industrial de su tiempo, Marx [-@marx-1973, pp.

690-711] predice que la tendencia del capital hacia la mecanización de

la producción y la eliminación consecuente del trabajo asalariado hará

explotar el sistema.  El fundador de la cibernética, Norbert Weiner

[-@weiner-1950] vio que su mayor consecuencia sería la eliminación

computarizada del trabajo.  Esta tesis digital sobre el "fin del

trabajo" ha sido desarrollada muy francamente por pensadoras como Andre

Gorz [-@gorz-1985] y Jeremy Rifkin [-@rifkin-1995].  Sin embargo,

a fines del siglo XX el capital había notoriamente evitado este

escenario.  Lejos de automatizar completamente el trabajo, había salido

a buscar tanto las reservas globales de trabajo barato como había

seguido una "marcha de los sectores" que impulsó un frente móvil de

comodificación del trabajo a través de la agricultura, la industria

y los servicios.[^?]  Desde el 2000, no obstante, el debate sobre la

automatización se ha renovado.  La reducción continua de los costos

computacionales, las mejoras en las tecnologías visuales y táctiles, las

inversiones militares de las guerras post-11S en drones y vehículos

autónomos y las demandas salariales de las trabajadoras en China, India

y otras fuentes de trabajo barato ha disparado una "nueva ola de

robots... mucho más adeptos que aquellos utilizados comunmente por las

automotrices y otras fábricas pesadas", más flexibles y fáciles de

entrenar, reemplazando trabajadoras no solo en la manufactura sino

también en los procesos de distribución, circulación y servicios, como

el almacenamiento, los _call-centers_ e incluso el cuidado de las

ancianas [@markoff-2012].  Erik

[^?]: No se entiende un carajo esto.

Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (2011: 9), economists at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have sounded an alarm that the

‘pace and scale of this encroachment into human skills’ is now

production speed-up. If, however, there were no dominant structural

tendency for increases in productivity to lead to unemployment or

greater output without reduction in labour time, automation could

  systematically yield to less time spent in formal workplaces. In a

  communist framework that protected access to the use value of goods

systematically yield to less time spent in formal workplaces. In

a communist framework that protected access to the use value of goods

and services, robotization creates the prospect of a passage from the

realm of necessity to freedom. It reintroduces the goal – closed down

both within the Stakhanovite Soviet experiment and in the wage-raising

this allows both in terms of human selfdevelopment and communal

engagement.  Juliet Schor’s (1991) estimate, that if American workers

had taken gains won from productivity increases since the 1950s, not

  in wages but in time off, they would by 2000 have been working a

  twenty hour week. It indicates the scale of possible change. Proposals

  for a ‘basic income’ have recently figured in left politics. There are

    certainly criticisms to be made of these insofar as they are

    advanced as a reformist strategy, with the risk of becoming merely a

    rationalized welfare provision supporting neoliberal precarity. But

in wages but in time off, they would by 2000 have been working

a twenty hour week. It indicates the scale of possible change.

Brynjolfsson y Andrew McAfee [-@brynjolfsson-mcafee], economistas del

MIT, han dado la alarma sobre "el ritmo y la escala de esta usurpación

de las capacidades humanas" está alcanzando un nuevo nivel con

"profundas implicaciones económicas".  Estas preocupaciones se están

haciendo eco entre los economistas _mainstream_ [@klugman-2012].  

Proposals for a ‘basic income’ have recently figured in left politics.

There are certainly criticisms to be made of these insofar as they are

advanced as a reformist strategy, with the risk of becoming merely

a rationalized welfare provision supporting neoliberal precarity. But

it would be hard to envision a meaningful communist future that did

    not institute such measures to acknowledge the reductions in

    socially necessary labour time made possible by advances in science

    and technology, destroying Hayek’s calculation problem by

    progressively subtracting from it the capitalist ur-commodity,

    labour power.  If robots undermine the centrality of the wage

    relation, the Internet presents a parallel possibility, priceless

    goods. Mainstream economists have long recognized the anomalous

    features of nonrivalrous informational goods, which can be endlessly

    copied at almost zero cost, all but instantaneously circulated, and

    shared without detracting from their use value. As intellectual and

    cultural production have become increasingly digitized, these

    tendencies to make the Internet ‘a place of plenty’ (Siefkes, 2012:

    np) have become increasingly problematic for the price system.

    Capital has struggled to maintain the commodity form in cyberspace,

    either by attempts to enforce intellectual property, or by treating

    informational flows as advertising accelerators for other

    commodities. Nonetheless, the drift to software decommodification

    has proven ineradicable, and been intensified by the capacities to

    conduct this circulation outside of centrally controlled servers,

    through peer-to-peer networks. Piracy, which now accounts for the

    majority of digital music, games, film and other software

    distributed in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe

    (Karaganis et al., 2011) is the clandestine and criminalized

    manifestation of this tendency; and the free and open source

    software movement its organized expression.  The latter has been the

    focus of interest on the libertarian left since the inauguration of

    the Free Software Foundation (by Richard Stallman in 1984), which

    released code under a General Public License (GPL), guaranteeing

    users the freedom to repurpose, study, customize, redistribute, and

    change it. As Jacob Rigi (2012) observes, the so-called ‘copyleft’

    clause in the GPL, which requires that any program using GPL code is

    itself issued under GPL, is a ‘dialectical negation’ of copyright,

    because it simultaneously preserves and abolishes property in

    software, formulating ‘an allinclusive global property right’. This

    development was elaborated by Linus Torvalds’ organization in the

    early 1990s of the online voluntary collective cooperative method

    for open-source software production. As Rigi (2012) says, the

      combination of GPL license and Linux-style open source collective

      programming ‘represents the gist of the P2P [peer-to-peer] mode of

      production’; he sees in this an instantiation of Marx’s ‘higher

      communism’, acknowledging the collective nature of scientific

      knowledge, and rejecting any scarcitybased demand for ‘equivalence

      between contribution to social production and share of social

      product’.  Open source software has attained considerable

      practical success (Weber, 2004), while P2P production has

      developed in various directions, with its political inflection

      ranging from libertarian capitalism, to liberal views of the new

      ‘wealth of networks’ (Benkler, 2006) as supplementary to and

      compatible with markets, to specifically communist versions, such

      as the Oekonux project (Meretz,

not institute such measures to acknowledge the reductions in socially

necessary labour time made possible by advances in science and

technology, destroying Hayek’s calculation problem by progressively

subtracting from it the capitalist ur-commodity, labour power.  If

robots undermine the centrality of the wage relation, the Internet

presents a parallel possibility, priceless goods. Mainstream

economists have long recognized the anomalous features of nonrivalrous

informational goods, which can be endlessly copied at almost zero

cost, all but instantaneously circulated, and shared without

detracting from their use value. As intellectual and cultural

production have become increasingly digitized, these tendencies to

make the Internet ‘a place of plenty’ (Siefkes, 2012: np) have become

increasingly problematic for the price system. Capital has struggled

to maintain the commodity form in cyberspace, either by attempts to

enforce intellectual property, or by treating informational flows as

advertising accelerators for other commodities. Nonetheless, the drift

to software decommodification has proven ineradicable, and been

intensified by the capacities to conduct this circulation outside of

centrally controlled servers, through peer-to-peer networks. Piracy,

which now accounts for the majority of digital music, games, film and

other software distributed in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern

Europe (Karaganis et al., 2011) is the clandestine and criminalized

manifestation of this tendency; and the free and open source software

movement its organized expression.  The latter has been the focus of

interest on the libertarian left since the inauguration of the Free

Software Foundation (by Richard Stallman in 1984), which released code

under a General Public License (GPL), guaranteeing users the freedom

to repurpose, study, customize, redistribute, and change it. As Jacob

Rigi (2012) observes, the so-called ‘copyleft’ clause in the GPL,

which requires that any program using GPL code is itself issued under

GPL, is a ‘dialectical negation’ of copyright, because it

simultaneously preserves and abolishes property in software,

formulating ‘an allinclusive global property right’. This development

was elaborated by Linus Torvalds’ organization in the early 1990s of

the online voluntary collective cooperative method for open-source

software production. As Rigi (2012) says, the combination of GPL

license and Linux-style open source collective programming ‘represents

the gist of the P2P [peer-to-peer] mode of production’; he sees in

this an instantiation of Marx’s ‘higher communism’, acknowledging the

collective nature of scientific knowledge, and rejecting any

scarcitybased demand for ‘equivalence between contribution to social

production and share of social product’.  Open source software has

attained considerable practical success (Weber, 2004), while P2P

production has developed in various directions, with its political

inflection ranging from libertarian capitalism, to liberal views of

the new ‘wealth of networks’ (Benkler, 2006) as supplementary to and

compatible with markets, to specifically communist versions, such as

the Oekonux project (Meretz,

2012), with the ecumenical Foundation for P2P Alternatives (Bauwens,

2012) working across the entire spectrum.  However, even if one regards

open source and P2P as a germinal of a new mode of production,