From 61574f48cd01d0b7f7283757a18cfcc7113876e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 13:28:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] correct spelling and capitalization
---
draft-dkg-dprive-demux-dns-http.md | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/draft-dkg-dprive-demux-dns-http.md b/draft-dkg-dprive-demux-dns-http.md
index 1cec64f..990ed7d 100644
--- a/draft-dkg-dprive-demux-dns-http.md
+++ b/draft-dkg-dprive-demux-dns-http.md
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ and 3*2560 == 7680 RRs. But:
12 + 5*2560 + 11*7680 == 97292
So the smallest possible DNS message where none of these four
-inequalites hold is 97292 octets. But a DNS message is limited in
+inequalities hold is 97292 octets. But a DNS message is limited in
size to 65535 octets.
Therefore at least one of these inequalities holds, and one of the
@@ -592,10 +592,10 @@ brackets after each mitigation]:
\[bytestream\[5] == 0x00]
* Ensure that the high bit of the first octet of the message ID of
- the first message is set. \[bytesteam\[2] > 0x7F]
+ the first message is set. \[bytestream\[2] > 0x7F]
* Send an initial short Server Status DNS message ahead of the
- otherwise intended initial DNS message. \[bytstream\[0] == 0x00]
+ otherwise intended initial DNS message. \[bytestream\[0] == 0x00]
* Use the EDNS(0) padding option {{RFC7830}} to pad the first
message to a multiple of 256 octets. \[bytestream\[1] == 0x00]
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ able to omit some records)
FIXME: if widely deployed, consider amplification for DDoS against
authoritative servers?
-FIXME: consider dnssec transparency
+FIXME: consider DNSSEC transparency
FIXME: consider TLS session resumption -- this counts as a new stream
boundary, so the multiplexing decision need not persist across
--
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