diff --git a/content/posts/e2ee/index.md b/content/posts/e2ee/index.md index d3b0772b8a531716daed6bdb68c8a28b5e6d4be9..0f5e3fde3aba194d509f418a16f629a6ae3824a8 100644 --- a/content/posts/e2ee/index.md +++ b/content/posts/e2ee/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ For a more in-depth look at these various considerations, we recommend [The Guid The following options for encrypted messaging are listed from most metadata protection to least. -TLDR: use Cwtch. +TLDR: Use Cwtch. Don't use Signal or PGP. <br> @@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ The Signal Protocol has a moderate amoung of metadata protection; [sealed sender Signal [is not peer-to-peer](https://www.csrc.link/#the-guide-to-peer-to-peer-encryption-and-tor); it uses centralized servers that we must trust. Signal will work with Tor if used on an operating system that forces it to, such as Whonix or Tails. -However, signing up for a Signal account is difficult to do anonymously. The account is tied to a phone number that the user still needs to control - due to [changes to "Registration Lock"](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/11/10/signal-number-registration-update/), it is no longer sufficient to register with a disposable phone number. In the future, Signal plans to [remove the need for a phone number](https://signal.org/blog/building-faster-oram/), but until then, Signal cannot be easily used anonymously. An anonymous phone number can be obtained [on a burner phone or online](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#getting-an-anonymous-phone-number) and must be maintained. +Signing up for a Signal account is difficult to do anonymously. The account is tied to a phone number that the user still needs to control - due to [changes to "Registration Lock"](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/11/10/signal-number-registration-update/), it is no longer sufficient to register with a disposable phone number. An anonymous phone number can be obtained [on a burner phone or online](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#getting-an-anonymous-phone-number) and must be maintained - most people will not do this. There have been unfounded rumours that Signal plans to remove the need for a phone number after the release of a username feature - however, [registration will continue to require a phone number](https://mastodon.world/@Mer__edith/110895045552696836). Another barrier to anonymous registration is that Signal Desktop only works if Signal is first registered from a smartphone. For users familiar with the [command line](/glossary/#command-line-interface-cli), it is possible to register an account from a computer using [Signal-cli](http://wmj5kiic7b6kjplpbvwadnht2nh2qnkbnqtcv3dyvpqtz7ssbssftxid.onion/about.privacy/messengers-on-tails-os/-/wikis/HowTo#signal). The [VoIP](/glossary#voip-voice-over-internet-protocol) account used for registration would have to be obtained anonymously. -As a result, Signal is rarely used anonymously, which has significant implications if the State gains [physical](/glossary/#physical-attacks) or [remote](/glossary/#remote-attacks) access to the device. One of the primary goals of State surveillance of anarchists is [network mapping](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html), and it's not uncommon for them to gain physical access to devices through [house raids](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/house-raid.html) or even simple arrests. For example, if device [authentication is bypassed](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/authentication-bypass.html), it would be possible to identify every Signal contact simply by their phone number (in addition to reading message history, etc.). +These obstacles to anonymous registration result in Signal rarely being used anonymously. This has significant implications if the State gains [physical](/glossary/#physical-attacks) or [remote](/glossary/#remote-attacks) access to the device. One of the primary goals of State surveillance of anarchists is [network mapping](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html), and it's common for them to gain physical access to devices through [house raids](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/house-raid.html) or even simple arrests. For example, if your device's [authentication is bypassed](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/authentication-bypass.html), it would be possible to identify each of your Signal contacts simply by their phone number (in addition to reading message history, etc.). This is a serious security breach, especially in the context of Signal groups, and is unavoidable due to how Signal was designed. Compare this with the same attack on a Cwtch user - all contacts are anonymous and their identity is also protected by Tor, so device compromise does not contribute to network mapping. -Due to the near impossibility of using Signal anonymously, and our [recommendation not to use phones](/posts/nophones/), we don't currently recommend that anarchists use Signal. We provide installation instructions, however, because it has become the norm in the anarchist space in many countries, and it may be difficult to contact someone without it. +**Simply put, Signal is not appropriate for an anarchist threat model** - it is designed to bring encrypted communications to the masses. Due to the near impossibility of using Signal anonymously, and our [recommendation not to use phones](/posts/nophones/), **we recommend that anarchists don't use Signal**. We only provide installation instructions because it has become the norm in the anarchist space in many countries, and it may be difficult to contact someone without it. <details> <summary> @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ https_proxy = 127.0.0.1:8082 * **Peer-to-peer**: No * **Tor**: Not default -PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is not so much a messaging platform as it is a way to encrypt messages on top of existing messaging platforms (in this case, email). PGP email does not have the encryption property of [*forward secrecy*](/glossary/#forward-secrecy). The goal of forward secrecy is to protect past sessions from future key or password compromises. It maintains the secrecy of past communications even if the current communication is compromised. This means that an adversary could decrypt all future PGP messages in one fell swoop. When you also consider the metadata exposure inherent in email, PGP should be disqualified from inclusion on this list. It simply doesn't meet the standards of modern cryptography. However, since it is already widely used in the anarchist space, we include it here as a warning that it is not recommended. For a more technical critique, see [The PGP Problem](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) and [Stop Using Encrypted Email](https://latacora.micro.blog/2020/02/19/stop-using-encrypted.html). [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/email-security/) agrees that "email is best used for receiving transactional emails [...], not for communicating with others." +PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is not so much a messaging platform as it is a way to encrypt messages on top of existing messaging platforms (in this case, email). PGP email does not have the encryption property of [*forward secrecy*](/glossary/#forward-secrecy). The goal of forward secrecy is to protect past sessions from future key or password compromises. It maintains the secrecy of past communications even if the current communication is compromised. This means that an adversary could decrypt all future PGP messages in one fell swoop. When you also consider the metadata exposure inherent in email, PGP should be disqualified from inclusion on this list. It simply doesn't meet the standards of modern cryptography. However, since it is already widely used in the anarchist space, we include it here as a warning that **we recommend that anarchists don't use PGP**. For a more technical critique, see [The PGP Problem](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) and [Stop Using Encrypted Email](https://latacora.micro.blog/2020/02/19/stop-using-encrypted.html). [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/email-security/) agrees that "email is best used for receiving transactional emails [...], not for communicating with others." We recommend switching to Cwtch for synchronous and asynchronous use cases. If you must use email, use a [radical server](https://riseup.net/en/security/resources/radical-servers) and read the [Riseup Guide to Encrypted Email](https://riseup.net/en/security/message-security/openpgp).